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Abstract. Phishing is an important security issue to the Internet, which
has a signiﬁcant economic impact. The main solution to counteract this
threat is currently reactive blacklisting; however, as phishing attacks are
mainly performed over short periods of time, reactive methods are too
slow. As a result, new approaches to early identify malicious websites
are needed. In this paper a new proactive discovery of phishing related
domain names is introduced. We mainly focus on the automated detec-
tion of possible domain registrations for malicious activities. We leverage
techniques coming from natural language modelling in order to build pro-
active blacklists. The entries in this list are built using language models
and vocabularies encountered in phishing related activities - “secure”,
“banking”, brand names, etc. Once a pro-active blacklist is created, on-
going and daily monitoring of only these domains can lead to the eﬃcient
detection of phishing web sites.
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1 Introduction
The usage of e-commerce, e-banking and other e-services is already current prac-
tice in the life of modern Internet users. These services handle personal and con-
ﬁdential user data (login, password, account number, credit card number, etc.)
that is very sensitive. As a result, threats emerged for which attackers attempt
to steal this data and use it for lucrative purposes. An example of these threats is
phishing, a criminal mechanism employing both technical subterfuge and social
engineering to abuse the naivety of uninformed users. Phishing mainly targets
(75%) ﬁnancial and payment activities and its cost is estimated to many billion
of dollars per year1.
Phishing attacks leverage some techniques such as e-mail spooﬁng or DNS
cache poisoning to misdirect users to fake websites. Attackers also plant crime-
ware directly onto legitimate web server to steal users data. However, the two
last techniques require to penetrate web servers or change registration in DNS
server, which might be diﬃcult. Most often, phishers try to lure Internet users by
having them clicking on a rogue link. This link seemed to be trustworthy because
it contained a brand name or some keywords such as secure or protection.
1 http://www.brandprotect.com/resources/phishing.pdf, accessed on 04/04/12.
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Current protecting approaches rely on URL blacklists being integrated in
client web browsers. This prevents users from browsing malicious URLs. Google
Safe Browsing2 or Microsoft Smart Screen3 are two examples and their eﬃ-
ciency has been proved in [14]. However, as reported in [21], the average uptime
of phishing attacks is around 2 days and the median uptime is only 12 hours. Due
to this very short lifetime, reactive blacklisting is too slow to eﬃciently protect
users from phishing; hence, proactive techniques must be developed. The previ-
ous report also points out that some phishing attacks involve URLs containing
unique number in order to track targeted victims. The only common point be-
tween these unique URLs remains their domain name; as a result domain name
blacklisting should be more eﬃcient and useful than URL blacklisting. More-
over, it emphasizes that one maliciously registered domain name is often used
in multiple phishing attacks and that each of them use thousands of individual
URLs. As a result, the identiﬁcation of only one phishing domain name can lead
to protect Internet users from tens of thousand malicious URLs.
According to recent reports [21, 1] from the Anti Phishing Working Group
(APWG), the number of phishing attacks is fast growing. Between the ﬁrst half
of 2010 and the ﬁrst half of 2011 the number of phishing attacks raised from
48,244 to 115,472 and the number of dedicated registered domains from 4,755
to 14,650. These domains are qualiﬁed as maliciously registered domains by
the APWG. These counts highlight the trend that attackers prefer to use more
and more their own maliciously registered domains rather than hacked named
domains for phishing purposes. Moreover, observations reveal that malicious
domain names and particularly phishing ones are meaningful and composed of
several words to obfuscate URLs. Attackers insert some brands or keywords
that are buried in the main domain name to lure victims, as for instance in
protectionmicrosoftxpscanner.com, google-banking.com or
domainsecurenethp.com. As a result, this paper focuses on the identiﬁcation of
such phishing domain names that are used in URL obfuscation techniques.
This paper introduces a pro-active domain monitoring scheme that generates
a list of potential domain names to track in order to identify new phishing activ-
ities. The creation of the list leverages domain name features to build a natural
language model using Markov chains combined with semantic associations. We
evaluate and compare these features using real malicious and legitimate datasets
before testing the ability of our approach to pro-actively discover new phishing
related domains.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the design
of the architecture and the steps to follow to generate malicious domain names.
Section 3 introduces the datasets used for the validation and experimentation.
In section 4, diﬀerences between malicious and legitimate domains are analyzed
and domain name generation is tested in some real case studies. Finally, related
2 http://code.google.com/apis/safebrowsing/, accessed on 04/04/12.
3 http://windows.microsoft.com/en-US/internet-explorer/products/ie-9/
features/smartscreen-filter, accessed on 04/04/12.
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work is discussed in section 5. We conclude in section 6 and point out the further
research to be done.
2 Modeling a Phisher’s Language
Phishers are human and will generate names for their domains using some sim-
ple patterns. They will use names that are similar to legitimate domain names,
append some other words that come from a target vocabulary and leverage some
domain speciﬁc knowledge and expertise. Thus, we argue that pro-active mon-
itoring can emulate this process and generate potential domains to be tracked
permanently. This tracking can be done on a daily basis and thus detect new
phishing sites. This requires however to generate domain names that are or will
be involved in phishing activities. These names follow a model build on statis-
tical features. The domain names considered in our work are composed of two
parts, the top level domain (TLD) and the second level domain also called main
domain. In this approach, the TLD can be either only one level domain “.com”
or more “.org.br”, we refer to Public Suﬃx List4 to identify this part of the
URL and the main domain is considered as the label preceding the TLD. For
the rest of the paper these domains (main domain + TLD) will be called two-
level-domains. Assuming a dataset containing domain names and URLs such
as:
• www.bbc.co.uk
• wwwen.uni.lu/snt/
• secan-lab.uni.lu/index.php?option=com user&view=login
Features are extracted only from the two-level-domains, which are respectively
bbc.co.uk, with bbc the main domain and co.uk the TLD, for the ﬁrst one
and uni.lu for the two others, with uni the main domain and lu the TLD. The
domain names generated are also two-level-domains.
2.1 Architecture
An overview of our approach is illustrated in Figure 1 where the main input
is a list of known domains related to malicious activities. Based on that, the
ﬁrst stage (1) decomposes the name and extracts two main parts: the TLD
and the main domain. Then, each of these two is divided into words (2). For
TLD, a simple split regarding the dot character is suﬃcient but for the second,
a real word segmentation is required to catch meaningful words. As illustrated
here with a small example, macromediasetup.com/dl.exe, the following words are
extracted:
• TLD: com
• main domain: macro, media, set, up
4 http://publicsuffix.org, accessed on 08/03/12.
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Fig. 1. Proactive Malicious Domain Name Discovery – Overview
These features are then used to build a model (3) by computing statistics, as
for example the length distribution of the main domain in words as well as a
Markov chain for representing probabilistic word transitions. The statistics and
Markov chain model are computed for each level. Next, this model is combined
(4) with semantic extensions. This leads to generating similar words (only for
the main domain) and a list of potential malicious domain is built. These latter
are checked online (5) for potential phishing activities. The online validation is
not described in this paper, but can be done with various techniques: signature-
based approach, honeypots, manual analysis, etc. Hence, our experiments are
based on publicly available blacklists for cross-validation (see section 3).
2.2 Features Extraction
Features: Given a set of two-level-domains as D = {d1, ...., dp}, a set of words
as W = {w1; ....;wp} and a set of domain levels L = {l1; l2} where l1 is the TLD
and l2 is the main domain, we deﬁne:
• #lenl,n the number of domains d ∈ D having the lth level (l ∈ L) composed
of n words
• #wordl,w the number of domains d ∈ D containing the word w ∈ W at the
level l ∈ L
• #fisrtwordl,w the number of domains d ∈ D having the lth level (l ∈ L)
starting with the word w ∈ W
• #biwordsl,w1,w2 the number of domains d ∈ D containing the consecutive
words w1 and w2 ((w1, w2) ∈ W 2) at the level l ∈ L
The following list groups the features extracted from a list of domains or URLs:
• distlenl,n: the distribution of the length n ∈ N expressed in word for a level
l ∈ L and deﬁned as:
distlenl,n =
#lenl,n∑
i∈N #lenl,i
(1)
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• distwordl,w : the distribution of the number of occurrences of a word w ∈ W
at the level l ∈ L and deﬁned as:
distwordl,w =
#wordl,w∑
i∈W #wordl,i
(2)
• distfirstwordl,w : the distribution of the number of occurrences of a word
w ∈ W as ﬁrst word for the level l ∈ L and deﬁned as:
distfirstwordl,w =
#fisrtwordl,w∑
i∈W #fisrtwordl,i
(3)
• distbiwordsl,w1,w2 : the distribution of the number of occurrences of a word
w2 ∈ W following the word w1 ∈ W for the level l ∈ L and deﬁned as:
distbiwordsl,w1,w2 =
#biwordsl,w1,w2∑
i∈W #biwordsl,w1,i
(4)
Word Extraction: Themain domain of DNS names can be composed of several
words like computeraskmore or cloud-anti-malware. Using a list of separat-
ing characters, as for instance “-” is too restrictive. We have thus used a word
segmentation method, similar to the one described in [22]. The process is recur-
sive by successively dividing the label in 2 parts that give the best combination,
i.e. with the maximum probability, of the ﬁrst word and the remaining part.
Therefore, a label l is divided in 2 parts for each position i and the probability
is computed:
P (l, i) = Pword(pre(l, i))P (post(l, i)) (5)
where pre(l, i) returns the substring of l composed of the ﬁrst i characters and
sub(l, i) of the remaining part. Pword(w) returns the probability of having the
word W equivalent to its frequency in a database of text samples.
TLDs are split in diﬀerent labels using the separating character “.”.
2.3 Domain Names Generation Model
The generator designed for domain generation is mainly based on an n-gram
model. Coming from natural language processing an n-gram is a sequence of
n consecutive grams. These grams are usually characters, but in our approach,
grams are words. We especially focus on bigrams of words that are called biwords.
These couples of words are further used to build a Markov chain through which
two-level-domains are generated.
Markov Chain: A Markov chain is a mathematical system that undergoes
transitions from one state to another. Each possible transition between two states
can be taken with a transition probability. Two Markov chains are deﬁned in the
domain generation model, one for each level, l1 and l2. The states of the Markov
chains are deﬁned as the words w ∈ W and the probability of transition between
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two words w1 and w2 for the level l ∈ {1; 2} is given by distbiwordsl,w1,w2 . A
part of a created Markov chain is given in Table 1 for some transitions, and
the associated probabilities, starting from the word pay. In order to generate
new names the Markov chain is completed with additional transitions that have
never been observed - this technique is called additive smoothing or Laplace
smoothing. For each state s, a small probability (0.05) is assigned for transitions
to all the words that have been observed at the level l and for which s does
not have any transition yet. This probability is shared between the words of the
level l according to the distribution distwordl,w . The same method is applied for
states s that do not have any existing transitions. In this case, their transitions
follow the probability given by the distribution distwordl,w .
Table 1. Example of Markov chain transitions for the state pay
Transition per z for secure bucks bill process pay account soft page ...
Probability 0.13 0.1 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 ...
For two-level-domains generation, the ﬁrst state is randomly initialized us-
ing distfirstwordl,w , the number of transitions that must be completed in the
Markov chain is randomly determined using distlenl,n. Given these two param-
eters by applying n steps from word w in the Markov chain, a label is generated
for the level l.
Semantic Exploration: The words composing the main domains of diﬀer-
ent malicious domains often belong to the one or more shared semantic ﬁelds.
Given some malicious domain names such as xpantiviruslocal.com, xpantivirus-
planeta.com, xpantivirusmundo.com and xpantivirusterra.com, it clearly appears
that they are related. Applying the word extraction process, from all of these do-
mains, the words “xp”, “anti” and “virus” will be extracted and the four words
“local”, “planeta”, “mundo” and “terra” will be extracted from each of them.
These four words are closely related, particularly the three last ones. As a result,
given one of these domains, the remaining three could be found as well. However,
even if this intuitive conclusion is obvious for human, it is more complicated to
implement it in an automatic system.
For this purpose, DISCO [12] is leveraged, a tool based on eﬃcient and accu-
rate techniques to automatically give a score of relatedness between two words.
To calculate this score, called similarity, DISCO deﬁnes a sliding window of four
words. This window is applied to the content of a dictionary such as Wikipedia5
and the metric ‖w, r, w′‖ is calculated as the number of times that the word w′
occur r words after the word w in the window, therefore r ∈ {−3; 3}\{0}. Table
2 highlights an example of the calculation of ‖w, r, w′‖ for two sample pieces of
text. Afterwards the mutual information between w and w′, I(w, r, w′) is deﬁned
as:
I(w, r, w′) = log
(‖w, r, w′‖ − 0.95)× ‖∗, r, ∗‖
‖w, r, ∗‖ × ‖∗, r, w′‖ (6)
5 http://www.wikipedia.org, accessed on 04/04/12.
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Finally, the similarity sim(w1, w2) between two words w1 and w2 is given by the
formulae:
sim(w1, w2) =
∑
(r,w)∈T (w1)∩T (w2) I(w1, r, w) + I(w2, r, w)∑
(r,w)∈T (w1) I(w1, r, w) +
∑
(r,w)∈T (w2) I(w2, r, w)
(7)
where T (w) is all the pairs (r, w′) | I(w, r, w′) > 0.
Using this measure and given a word w1, DISCO returns the x most related
words ordered by their respective similarity score sim(w1, w2). Based on the
words extracted from the main domain, DISCO is used to compose new labels
for the main domain.
Table 2. Example of co-occurrence counting (2 windows centered on services)
position -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
sample 1 a client uses services of the platform
sample 2 the platform provides services to the client
||services,−3, a|| = 1 ||services,−3, the|| = 1
||services,−2, client|| = 1 ||services,−2, platform|| = 1
||services,−1, uses|| = 1 ||services,−1, provides|| = 1
||services, 1, of || = 1 ||services, 1, to|| = 1
||services,2,the|| = 2 ||services, 3, client|| = 1
||services, 3, platform|| = 1
A complete example of label generation is illustrated in Figure 2 for the level
2 (main domain) with (1), the selection of the length of the label in words, and
(2) the selection of the ﬁrst word that starts the label. The Markov chain is
applied for the remaining words to generate (3). For each word at the step (2)
and (3), DISCO is applied to generate other words. The same scheme generates
TLD for the level 1 without using DISCO.
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Fig. 2. Main domain generator
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3 Dataset
For assessing our approach, two datasets are selected. The ﬁrst one is a ma-
licious dataset composed of domain names from which maliciousness has been
conﬁrmed. The second dataset is a legitimate dataset containing non-malicious
domain names. In a ﬁrst step, these will be used to show that the features intro-
duced in section 2.2 allow to discriminate phishing domain names from legitimate
ones. In a second step, the malicious dataset will be used to show the eﬃciency
of the generation of phishing domain names.
3.1 Malicious Dataset
To compose the dataset of malicious domain names, three freely downloadable
blacklists are used. These have been selected because each of them proposes an
historical list of blacklisted domains ordered by their discovery date. These have
been collected during at least the last three years. This is an essential dataset
requirement in order to test the predictability of the approach.
• PhishTank6: PhishTank is a community website where anybody can submit
a suspicious phishing URL that will be further checked and veriﬁed. The
downloaded historical blacklist contains 3,738 phishing URLs.
• DNS-BH7: DNS-Black-Hole aims to maintain an up-to-date list of domains
that spread malware and spyware. A list of 17,031 malicious domains is
available.
• MDL8: Malware Domain List is another community project aimed at cre-
ating and maintaining a blacklist of domains involved in malware spreading.
This list contains 80,828 URL entries.
DNS-BH and MDL are not only dedicated to phishing, but also to malware dif-
fusion. These two lists have been chosen because as described in [1], diﬀusion
of malware designed for data-stealing and particularly crimeware is a big part
of phishing activities. This various dataset allows also to strengthen the vali-
dation of our approach (introduced in section 4). Following the extraction of
the distinct domain names from the 101,597 URLs and the deletion of dupli-
cated entries between the three lists, the ﬁnal dataset contains 51,322 diﬀerent
two-level-domains. Out of these 51,322 domain names, 39,980 have their main
domain divisible in at least two parts.
3.2 Legitimate Dataset
The objective is to faithfully represent realistic normal domain names. This
dataset is selected to show that even if malicious domains use some brands
6 http://www.phishtank.com, accessed on 15/03/12.
7 http://www.malwaredomains.com, accessed on 15/03/12.
8 http://www.malwaredomainlist.com, accessed on 15/03/12.
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included in the URLs of famous websites in order to mimic them, they still
disclose diﬀerences. Two sources are chosen to compose this “legitimate” dataset.
• Alexa9: Alexa is a company that collects browsing behavior information
in order to report statistics about web traﬃc and websites ranking. From
Alexa’s “top 1000000 sites” list, 40,000 domain names are randomly picked
in the top 200,000 domains.
• Passive DNS: To diversify this dataset and in order to have the same
amount of domain names in each dataset, we had it completed with 11,322
domain names extracted from DNS responses. DNS responses were passively
gathered from DNS recursive servers of some Luxembourg ISPs. We ensure
that these domain names are not present in the initial dataset from Alexa.
The normal dataset contains 51,322 entries. 38,712 names have their main do-
main divisible in at least two parts. Hence, we have two datasets: a legitimate
one and a malicious one of equivalent size.
4 Experiments
4.1 Datasets Analysis
In this section metrics and statistical parameters extracted from each dataset are
compared to demonstrate that features described before are able to distinguish
malicious from legitimate domains. A ﬁrst proposition is to analyze the number
of words that composes the main domain name #len2,n. Main domains that
can be split in at least two parts are considered. The malicious dataset contains
39,980 such domain names and the legitimate dataset 38,712. Figure 3 shows
the distribution of the ratio of main domains that are composed from 2 to 10
words (distlen2,n | n ∈ {2; 10}) in the legitimate dataset and in the malicious
dataset.
69% of legitimate main domains are composed of two words whereas only
50% of malicious are. For all upper values, the ratio for malicious domains is
higher than for legitimate ones. This shows that malicious main domains tend
to be composed of more words than legitimate main domains.
The following analysis studies the composition similarity between the domain
names of the diﬀerent datasets. Two probabilistic distributions are extracted
from the domain names:
• the diﬀerent labels of the TLDs: ∀w ∈ W,P1(w) = distword1,w
• the diﬀerent words that compose the main domains : ∀w ∈ W,P2(w) =
distword2,w
We used the Hellinger Distance to evaluate the similarity in each dataset and dis-
similarity between datasets. The Hellinger Distance is a metric used to quantify
9 http://www.alexa.com, accessed on 15/03/12.
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Fig. 3. distlen2,n | n ∈ {2; 10} for malicious and legitimate dataset
the similarity (or dissimilarity) between two probabilistic distributions P and
Q. In continuous space, the deﬁnition is:
H2(P,Q) =
1
2
∫ (√
dP
dλ
−
√
dQ
dλ
)2
dλ (8)
The equivalent function in discrete space distribution is given by:
H2(P,Q) =
1
2
∑
x∈P∪Q
(√
P (x) −
√
Q(x)
)2
(9)
It’s an instance of f-divergence as well as KL-divergence metric. Hellinger Dis-
tance is symmetric and bounded on [0; 1] where 1 is a total dissimilarity (P ∩Q =
∅) and where 0 means that P and Q have the same probabilistic distribution.
This metric is preferred rather than more usual metric such as Jaccard Index
or KL-divergence. Jaccard Index only considers the presence or not of an element
in two datasets but never considers the probability associated to an element. KL-
divergence metric is an non-symmetric measure as well as unbounded function
([0;+∞]). Finally, KL-divergence requires that Q includes at least the same
elements of P : ∀iP (i) > 0 ⇒ Q(i) > 0. This constraint may not be satisﬁed with
our datasets.
The malicious dataset and legitimate datasets are randomly split in ﬁve
smaller subsets, respectively mal-x and leg-x | x ∈ {1; 5}, of equivalent size
(∼ 10000 domains). Table 3 shows the Hellinger Distance for TLDs distribu-
tion between all the subset P1(w). Globally all the TLDs are quite the same
in all subsets (0 < H(P,Q) < 0.15), a clear diﬀerence is although present in
H(P,Q) when P and Q are picked from the same dataset (leg/leg or mal/mal,
H(P,Q) ∼ 0.015) or from two diﬀerent datasets (leg/mal, H(P,Q) ∼ 0.130).
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Table 3. Hellinger Distance for TLDs (leg=legitimate, mal=malicious)
leg-5 leg-4 leg-3 leg-2 leg-1 mal-5 mal-4 mal-3 mal-2
mal-1 0.133 0.136 0.133 0.129 0.134 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.014
mal-2 0.134 0.140 0.135 0.131 0.135 0.014 0.012 0.013
mal-3 0.135 0.139 0.134 0.131 0.136 0.013 0.013
mal-4 0.130 0.136 0.131 0.127 0.132 0.013
mal-5 0.134 0.138 0.132 0.129 0.134
leg-1 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.019
leg-2 0.018 0.020 0.018
leg-3 0.016 0.019
leg-4 0.017
0.0 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.20
Table 4 considers the words-in-main-domain distribution P2(w). Here, the
distributions are more scattered (0.4 < H(P,Q) < 0.6); however, diﬀerence is
higher between subsets created from distinct datasets (H(P,Q) ∼ 0.56) and
subsets of the same dataset. Moreover, we can see that malicious main domains
show more similarity between them (H(P,Q) ∼ 0.44) than legitimate main
domains between them (H(P,Q) ∼ 0.50).
Table 4. Hellinger Distance for words (leg=legitimate, mal=malicious)
leg-5 leg-4 leg-3 leg-2 leg-1 mal-5 mal-4 mal-3 mal-2
mal-1 0.564 0.571 0.561 0.566 0.565 0.446 0.439 0.443 0.438
mal-2 0.565 0.569 0.566 0.571 0.565 0.445 0.447 0.446
mal-3 0.561 0.566 0.563 0.569 0.564 0.448 0.444
mal-4 0.563 0.567 0.558 0.564 0.561 0.447
mal-5 0.564 0.565 0.554 0.555 0.558
leg-1 0.501 0.494 0.490 0.493
leg-2 0.493 0.497 0.496
leg-3 0.490 0.491
leg-4 0.489
0.4 0.44 0.48 0.52 0.56 0.6
Table 5 provides the statistics of the Markov chains for each dataset for
the main domain level. The number of initial states is given by Card(V ) |
∀w ∈ V,#fisrtwordl2,w > 0, the number of states corresponds to Card(W ) |
∀w ∈ W,#wordsl2 ,w > 0 and the number of transitions before implementa-
tion of Laplace smoothing is Card(U2) | ∀(w1, w2) ∈ U2,#biwordsl2,w1,w2 > 0.
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This table strengthens the assertion that words present in malicious main do-
mains are more related together than those present in legitimate main domains,
because Hellinger Distance is lower between malicious subsets compared to legit-
imate subsets despite the higher number of words (states) in the Markov chain
created from the malicious dataset.
These experiments show that our model built on top of blacklist will be able
to generate proactively maliciously registered domains with a limited impact
regarding legitimate ones.
Table 5. Markov Chain statistics for main domain
Metrics Legitimate Malicious
# initial states 14079 14234
# states 23257 26987
# transitions 48609 56286
4.2 Types of Generated Domains
The dataset chosen for the rest of the experiments is the whole malicious dataset
introduced in section 3.1. This dataset is split in two subsets and depending
on the experiment performed, the domains selection technique to compose the
subsets and the number of domains in each subset vary. One of these subsets
is called the training set, from which the features described in section 2.2 are
extracted in order to build the word generation system depicted in Figure 2,
section 2.1. Based on it, new domain names are generated and their maliciousness
is conﬁrmed only if they belong to the second subset called the testing set.
The term probing campaign is deﬁned as the generation of one million of
unique two-level-domains that are checked in term of existence and malicious-
ness. A domain name is considered as existing if it is actually reachable over the
Internet, i.e. it is mapped to an IP address. For each generated domain, a DNS
A request is performed and according to the DNS response status, the domain
name is considered as existing (status = NOERROR) or non-existing (status =
NXDOMAIN). For more information about DNS and its operation, the reader must
refer to [17–19].
The ﬁrst step of the experiments aims at analyzing the existence and the type
of generated domains. Figure 4 is an histogram depicting the run of ﬁve probing
campaigns using a generation model trained on 10% of the malicious dataset,
each of the ﬁve complete rectangle represents the number of existing domains
generated. We can see that over one million unique domains probed, between
80,000 and 110,000 so around 10% are potentially reachable over the Internet.
These existing domains are divided in three categories represented distinct ﬁlling
pattern in the histograms.
The white one represents the number of wildcarded domains. Domain wild-
carding is a technique that consists in associating an IP address to all possible
subdomains of a domain by registering a domain name such as *.yahoo.com. As
a result all DNS queries sent for a domain containing the suﬃx yahoo.comwill be
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answered with a NOERROR status DNS response containing always the same IP ad-
dress. This technique is useful to tolerate Internet users typing mistakes, or mis-
spelling of subdomain without any consequence. For instance, DNS requests for
domain such as wwe.yahoo.com, snt.yahoo.com or anyotherlabel.yahoo.com
will return the same IP address. However some TLDs such as .ws, .tk, .us.com,
etc. apply also wildcarding. As a result these TLDs have been identiﬁed in order
to discard all generated two-level-domains that contain one of them. We can see
that these domains represent between 75% and 85% (from 60,000 to 90,000) of
the domains discovered.
The remaining part is composed of two other categories. First some do-
mains are registered but lead to websites of domain name resellers such as Go-
Daddy or Future Media Architect. A lot of meaningful domain names belong
to this category, around 4,000 per campaign. Some examples of such domains
are freecolours.com or westeurope.com. Regarding a probing campaign, the
IP addresses obtained through DNS responses are stored and sorted by their
number of occurrences. The IP addresses having more than ﬁfty occurrences
are manually checked to see if they are either related to real hosting or domain
selling. Around ﬁfty IP addresses and ranges have been identiﬁed as leading to
domain name resellers. These domains are also discarded in our study, as they
are not likely to be malicious domains. Finally the black part represents the
domains that are unknown and have to be checked to conﬁrm if they are related
to phishing or not. As highlighted in Figure 4, the remaining potential malicious
domains represent only between 15,000 and 20,000 domains out from one million
of generated ones. This reduction is automated and allows discarding a lot of
domain names, which will reduce the overhead of the checking process.
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For domains of the unknown part that are known to be really legitimate or
phishing, a score, MCscore, is calculated. This latter measures the similitude
with the underlying training dataset, which have been used for building the
model. Assuming a two-level-domain w1w2 . . . wn.tld where wi is the i
th word
composing the name, wi may have been generated using DISCO from an original
word observed w′i. MCscore is computed as follows:
MCscore = distfirstword2,w′1 × simw1,w′1 ×
n∏
i=1
distbiwords2,wi,w′i+1 × simwi+1,w′i+1
(10)
The ﬁrst word probability is multiplied by each probability of crossed transition
in the Markov chain. If some parts are found using DISCO, the similarity score
given in equation (7) is used (simwi,wi = 1 else).
Figure 5 represents the cumulative sums of the ratio of domains (in %) that
have a score lower than x for each kind of label. These curves show that globally
phishing related domain names have a higher MCscore than legitimate ones,
around ten times higher. Even if a high number of domains are labeled as un-
known and some of them are legitimate, it is easy to discard a lot of them in
order to keep a set containing a main part of malicious domains. If we consider
as malicious only the generated domains having a MCscore higher than 0.001,
then 93% of the legitimate domains will be discarded while 57% of the malicious
domains will be kept. This technique can be used to avoid the use of a domain
checking technique, as introduced in 2.1, or to reduce its workload.
4.3 Eﬃciency and Steadiness of Generation
This section assesses the variation of the eﬃciency of the malicious domain
discovery regarding the ratio of domains in the testing set and in the training
set. Five probing campaigns are performed with a ratio that varies from 10%
training/90% testing (10/90) to 90% training/10% testing (90/10), the subsets
are randomly made up. Figure 6(a) shows the number of malicious domains
generated regarding the total number of probed names.
On one hand the best result is given by 30% training/70% testing with a total
number of 508 phishing domains discovered. When the testing set size decreases,
there are less domain names candidates that can be found, which implies that
more domains are discovered with 30/70 than 90/10. On the other hand, the
curve representing 10% training/90% testing grows faster, and after only 100,000
probes more than the half (217 domains) of the total number of phishing domains
generated are found. Following the curve’s trend, if more probes are performed, a
reasonable assumption is that more malicious domain names can be discovered.
Figure 6(b) depicts the steadiness of the discovery results. Five probing cam-
paigns are performed for the ratio that yields the best result: 30% training/70%
testing. The training and testing sets are randomly made up and are diﬀerent for
each campaign. Observations are similar for every tests which lead to discover
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Fig. 6. Number of domains discovered regarding the number of probes
around 500 phishing domains. Moreover, half of the discovered phishing domains
are generated during the ﬁrst 200,000 generations, highlighting the ability of our
system to generate the most likely malicious domains in priority before being
discarded for next probes.
4.4 Predictability
This experiment evaluates the time between the date when a malicious domain
name can be generated using the generator and the date it is actually blacklisted.
The training set is composed of the 10% oldest blacklisted domains and the
remaining 90% belong to the testing set. The testing set represent 34 months of
blacklisted domains and the training set 4 months. Figure 7 depicts the number
of malicious domain names generated regarding the number of months they are
actually blacklisted after their generation (m+x). A large quantity of generated
malicious domains appears in ﬁrst four months after their generation, 14 in
the two following months and 23 more in the next two months. This shows
that domain name composition follows fashion schemes because more malicious
domains that are discovered appear just after the ones that are used to train the
model. However, it is worth noting that such domains continue to be discovered
in the present showing that even old datasets can be useful to generate relevant
malicious domains
4.5 Strategy Evaluation
We have described in section 2 the two core building blocks for generating do-
main names: the Markov chain model and the semantic exploration module. The
impact of each module is assessed with respect to four strategies:
• MC: the Markov chain model alone.
• MC + 5 DISCO: the Markov chain model and for each selected state of the
Markov chain the ﬁve most related words, regarding DISCO, are tested.
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• MC + 5/20 DISCO: the Markov chain model and for each selected state of
the Markov chain ﬁve words randomly picked from the twenty most related
words, regarding Disco, are tested.
• MC + 5/50 DISCO: the Markov chain model and for each selected state of
the Markov chain ﬁve words randomly picked from the ﬁfty most related
words, regarding Disco, are tested.
The objective of this assessment is to identify the best tradeoﬀ between the suc-
cess rates in discovering rogue domain names with respect to the computational
eﬀort.
Figure 8 shows the number of actual generated malicious domain names with
respect to the number of probes performed over a probing campaign. The same
training set is used to build the generation model for the four diﬀerent probing
campaigns. It clearly comes out that the Markov chain model alone yields the
best results in term of number of malicious domain names discovered with a to-
tal of 370. However even if DISCO strategies are able to generate only between
57 and 90 malicious domain names over these campaigns depending on the tech-
nique, between 79% and 85% of these generated domains are unique, i.e. none of
the other strategies are able to ﬁnd them. If a global probing is targeted all the
part of the generation module must be used in order to discover the maximum of
phishing related domain names. However, the Markov chain model is suﬃcient
to ﬁnd out domains over a short period of time.
5 Related Work
Because of their essential role, anti-phishing and identiﬁcation of malicious do-
main are increasingly popular and addressed in several previous works. Two ma-
jor approaches exist: methods based on blacklists and heuristics-based methods.
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Heuristic-based approaches rely on classiﬁcation algorithms to identify
whether a domain is malicious or not, based on features extracted from dif-
ferent sources. The leveraging of machine learning techniques to classify on the
ﬂy, domains as malicious or benign is widely used, with either batch methods
such as SVM, Naive Bayes, Logistic Regression(like in [2–4]), or on-line classiﬁ-
cation algorithms such as Conﬁdence Weighted (CW), Adaptive Regularization
of Weight (AROW), Passive-Aggressive (PA) (see [5, 9, 15]).
Their diﬀerences are mainly related to the feature set. In [2–4], the building
of classiﬁcation models relies on passively gathered DNS queries to ﬁgure out
predominantly malware domains involved in botnet communications. However
for phishing detection purposes, it can be either host-based features (WHOIS
info, IP preﬁx, AS number) in [15] or web page content-based features in [25].
The majority of features are however extracted directly from URLs. These
can be for instance the type of protocol, hostname, TLD, domain length, length
of URL, etc. In [5, 9, 11], the authors particularly focus on the tokens that
compose a complete URL, which includes the domain as well as the path and
the query. In these studies, the classiﬁcation is based on the relative position
of these tokens (domain or path level for instance) or the combination of these
tokens (token1.token2/token3/token4?token5=token6 ). The conclusion is that
tokens that occur in phishing URLs belong to a limited dictionary and tend to
get reused in other URLs. Moreover, Garera et al., in [8], are the ﬁrst to use the
occurrences of manually deﬁned words (secure, banking, login, etc.) in URL as
features. In [13], Le et al. use both batch and on-line classiﬁcation techniques to
show that lexical features extracted from URLs are suﬃcient to detect phishing
domains. Even also based on lexical features, our work is diﬀerent as we consider
meaningful words that compose the same label of a domain name. Moreover, our
work consists in a predictive and active discovery rather than classiﬁcation of
domain names observed on network traﬃc.
There have been other works taken advantage of URL based lexical analysis
for diﬀerent purposes. In [27], statistical measures are applied to alphanumeric
characters distribution and bigrams distribution in URLs in order to detect
algorithmically generated ﬂuxing domains. The same technique is used in [6]
to detect DNS tunnels and, in [26], Xie et al. generate signature for spamming
URLs using Regular Expressions. URLs related to the same spam campaign are
grouped for creating a signature based on regular expression.
This work is close to our approach but only lead to disclose domain names
related to a speciﬁc spam campaign from which some domain names have been
already observed. Our approach is more general and allows discovering new
phishing domains that have no apparent relations with previous ones.
Blacklisting approaches consist in the partially manual construction of a
list of malicious URLs that will be used by web browser or e-mail client in
order to prevent the users to access them. Due to their short lifetime, the early
identiﬁcation of phishing websites is paramount, as a result several methods
have been proposed to avoid reactive blacklisting and develop more proactive
methods. In [10], Hao et al. analyze early DNS behavior of newly registered
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domains. It is demonstrated that they are characterized by DNS infrastructure
pattern and DNS lookup patterns monitored as soon as they are registered, such
as either a wide scattering of resource records across the IP address space in
only few regions, or resource records that are often hosted in tainted autonomous
systems. A very close approach is used in [7] to build proactive domain blacklists.
Assuming a known malicious domain, zone information is mined to check if other
domains are registered at the same time, on the same name server and on the
same registrar. However, this approach cannot be widely applied because domain
zone information is not always available and needs a prior knowledge.
Predictive blacklisting is also addressed in [28] where it’s assumed that a host
should be able to predict future attackers from the mining of its logs. Hence,
a host can create its own customized blacklist well ﬁtted to its own threats.
The composition of this blacklist relies also on other machines’ logs that are
considered as similar. This similarity score is calculated using the number of
common attackers between two victims and stored into a graph explored using a
PageRank algorithm to estimate whether a domain is likely to conduct an attack
against a particular victim or not. The similarity calculation is reﬁned in[23].
Another proactive blacklisting approach to detect phishing domains is ad-
dressed through Phishnet in [20]. This work is the closest to ours, the idea is
to discover new phishing URLs based on blacklist of existing phishing URLs.
As in [26], URLs are clustered based on their shared common domain names,
IP addresses or directory structures, then a regular expression is extracted from
each cluster. The variable part of regular expression is exploited to generate new
URLs instead of only compare existing URLs to extracted patterns like in [26].
Though this method is more proactive than the previous ones, it is only able
to disclose URLs related to already blacklisted URLs that are likely to belong
to the same phishing attack. Whereas these URLs are part of a very small pool
of domains, our approach is capable to extend the knowledge about distinct
phishing attacks. Therefore these approaches are quite complementary.
Finally we have already treated and proved the eﬃcacy of algorithmic domain
generation based on Markov chain in [24]. We apply this technique on bigrams
in order to perform a discovery of all the subdomains (www, mail, ftp) of a given
domain (example.com). We extend this approach in [16], based on an existing
list of subdomains, we leverage semantic tools and incremental techniques to
discover more subdomains.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper introduces an eﬃcient monitoring scheme for detecting phishing sites.
The main idea consists in generating a list of potential domain names that might
be used in the future by an attacker. This list can be checked on a daily basis to
detect the apparition of a new phishing site. The list is generated using language
models applied to known ground truth data. We have proposed a novel technique
to generate domain names following a given pattern that can be learned from
existing domain names. This domain generation leverages a Markov chain model
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and relevant lexical features extracted from a semantic splitter. Domain speciﬁc
knowledge is added from semantic tools. The eﬃciency of this generation tool is
tested on the real world datasets of phishing domain names. We proved that our
method is able to generate hundreds of new domain names that are actually re-
lated to phishing and appear to be in use in the period following their generation.
To the best of our knowledge, our approach is the only one to propose proactive
generation and discovery of malicious domains, which is complementary to state
of the art approaches that addressed proactive blacklisting of URLs.
In future works, the remaining part of the architecture, the domain checker, will
be implemented shortly. Furthermore, the feedback from this checker will be used
to adapt the Markov chain transition probability through reinforcement learning
in order to strengthen the generation model. The code is available on request.
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